Like most youngsters of my generation, I collected stamps, and found them hugely interesting as well as instructive in terms of geography and currencies. However, stamp-collecting did not lead me to any great appreciation of history. That was probably due to the fact that, as the family fortunes were then rather low, I could not afford to spend money on actually buying stamps – let alone proper stamp albums – by means of which I might have specialised or at least followed some theme or other. In any case, I stopped collecting stamps even in my poor fashion around the time I started studying for what I was told would be my life-shaping high school leaving exams.
So, it was a shock to discover, some time later, that such apparently innocent and everyday activities as correspondence and the issuing of stamps had their origins in espionage and information-control. These are of course essential to keeping political control of any non-democratic populace – and, even in democratic countries, espionage and information control (not to mention information-management!) are essential to preserving every country’s independence.
I wonder – If I had known the relevance of letter writing, postal systems, and stamp-issuance to policing the mind-space and political choices of peoples, would that have make me a less enthusiastic or more enthusiastic stamp-collector?
Among my friends and I, there was very little awareness or consideration of the future impacts of present choices. At the time, I studied in some desultory fashion, not because I loved learning, nor because I had any inkling of the life of the mind, but because I was told to study – certainly not because I was able to hold in my mind the link between academic performance and “good jobs” in later life – though I am sure I was told that often enough by parents, neighbours, and teachers. There was even less awareness of the influence of the past on the present. Looking back on it, that was surprising because, living as I did in Delhi, there were historical monuments all around me, beautiful, stately, derelict, and so on.
I am not sure whether awareness of the impact of the past, and lively awareness of the future consequences of present choices, constitute the whole of wisdom. But do those not constitute part of it? Surely at least a small part?
**
Colonialism marks human existence almost from the beginnings of the human race. Does the murder of Abel by Cain not testify to egoism, aggression, a clash of values (hunting versus farming), and perhaps even greed? Are those not some of the worst aspects of human nature, and are those not at the root of all colonialism?
If those roots lie in the hidden chambers of the human heart, the fruit is unmissably visible: weapons, physical training, massive armies, impressive statues and buildings, institutionalised use of power for keeping “lesser beings” under the thumb – and of course economic arrangements for the benefit of the colonisers. Even seemingly innocuous achievements such as postal systems and stamps arose from, and were pressed into the service of, colonialist enterprise.
Probably all organisational expressions of colonialism have their visually, aesthetically, and emotionally attractive aspects. In the field we are discussing, these expressions include: post offices, post boxes, post office sales counters, the design of stamps, first day covers, and so on.
However, from the perspective of the ordinary person on the ground (the “subaltern” in the vocabulary of contemporary academic research), the lines between colonisation and reign, between kingdom and empire, are tenuously thin.
Why is that so? Because, from the perspective of the subaltern, colonialists, kings and emperors may be differently plumed but are all essentially exploitative and unjust, demanding not only a share of the wealth produced by the local productive classes, but also young men as cannon fodder and young women as useful palace appurtenances (the prophet Samuel puts this so elegantly in the eighth chapter of his first book, some eleven centuries before Christ).
But there are of course also profound differences between colonialists and colonialists, kings and kings, emperors and emperors. One may be more just, another more competent; the heart of one may be more set on expansion of territory; the heart of another on the prosperity and happiness of the people.
Moreover, unlike currently fashionable views about colonialism, neither a colonising people nor a colonised people is a single entity – and, even more important to understand, each entity may and usually does change over time.
For example, the history of British colonialism in India from the 1600s to 1947 is best understood as being in three broad phases.
In the first phase (from the 17th century to the early 19th century), the British changed from being merchant traders into occupiers who (initially de facto and, later, de jure) ruled increasing parts of the country. Like most Indian and other foreign rulers, the British were basically exploiters and looters, though there were marginal elements in their rule which could be described as benevolent. In this phase, any reference to “cleaning up corruption” is best understood, not as the elimination of looting, but as the legalisation, regulation, and centralisation of looting, much as is happening today under Xi in China, Modi in India, and Putin in Russia. In other words, under the “cleaned up system” represented by people such as Xi, Modi and Putin, the bulk of the fruit of national economic endeavour must serve, no longer primarily the disparate interests of adventurers and entrepreneurs, but rather the interests of the political entity in power. Though the East India Company was, in the eyes of British law, a privately-owned entity, on the ground, by the early 19th century it had already become the dominant political entity. In the first phase, the purpose of the colonial enterprise was clear: profit from power – and the more of both the better, regardless of ethics or consequences; though some Company officials did face consequences on their return to England, most such officials not only succeeded in attracting no ignominy for their ill-gotten gains, but indeed won favour and admiration.
In the second phase, from the early 19th century to the end of the 19th century, the British changed from being looters to being what is best described as farmers. Yes, they still had some tendencies to loot, but the dominant tendency changed to that of extracting a reasonable profit while also doing some good in the country (for example, even though they were still a commercial company, their enterprise was required by British law to spend a certain amount of money on education and health – the first example of legally-mandated “corporate social responsibility”). This was almost entirely due to the social and political impact of the spiritual movement known as Evangelicalism, whose Indian impact was only part of its overall impact, typified by the achievements of the Clapham Circle, which worked for and eventually succeeded in getting passed the legislation just referred to (requiring corporate social responsibility), but also eventually turned what had been, at the start of the 19th century, one of the most corrupt countries in the world, into one of the least corrupt. The result was that, by the end of the 19th century, England was looked up to as an inspiring social and political model of progressive improvement in most parts of the world. So, in the second phase, the purpose of colonial enterprise was different from that of the first phase, but continued to be clear – profit, but within some minimum legal, ethical and social constraints, which most people accepted as God-given.
In the third phase (basically the 20th century), the spiritual drive of Evangelicalism was blunted because of the counter-attack by those who found Evangelical ethical values limiting their preferred lifestyle choices. As that counter-attack gained force from the 1880s, more and more of the colonial enterprise lost its moral force. In other words, in the third phase, there continued to be an afterglow of the second phase – i.e., some profit, and the divine mandate became merely the “white man’s burden” (given by whom? And why on earth accepted by white people?). However, there seemed other benefits which made up for such losses – e.g., the colonies provided the bulk of the manpower necessary to confront and reverse the colonialist ambitions of the Nazis and other Axis powers. How temporary an advantage that was became evident at the end of World War II, when the British government saw that the British colonial enterprise was freewheeling, without purpose. Gandhi and other leaders of independence movements merely provided the push which caused the by-now essentially- hollow British colonialist enterprise to keel over.
To change the perspective and look at matters from that of the colonised people: they too were not homogenous entities. Just as the colonising people went through changes, so did the colonised people. To understand that in the case of India, it may be useful to pose some questions: Why did aboriginal Indians revolt so little under the various groups of “Aryan” colonisers who slaughtered and burned their way into India over centuries? Why did the Buddhist and Jain peoples of India submit so tamely to Brahmin colonisation of India under the leadership of Adi Guru Shankaracharya from the 8th century? Why was there so little unrest under the exploitative rule of most of the Mughal rulers? Is the answer to such questions not that it was essentially because, at the material level, the vast majority of people were so poor that their entire energies were focused on sheer survival – and, because, at the spiritual level, they had internalised the pernicious idea of birth into “their own” level of society (i.e., caste) in accordance with the degree to which they had kept to Brahminic rules in their previous life or lives? If the present misfortunes of a group are wholly accepted as just punishment for “sins” in a past incarnation, there is surely that much less motivation for revolt or even unrest?
By contrast, from the end of the 19th century, why did initially Indian elites and, later (under the leadership of Gandhi and Ambedkar) gradually greater masses of ordinary people, start demanding self-government after the manner of Westerners? Surely, primarily because of the efforts of the Evangelicals in England, who forced the Company to become more socially responsible and provide money for improving the conditions of life for the average Indian (as argued above) but also because they created institutions, such as Haileybury (and, later, even significantly reformed Eton and Harrow, and Oxford and Cambridge) so that such institutions started sending out now much more morally-responsible generations of administrators, doctors, engineers, and so on, whose hearts were focused, even while they were part of a layer of colonial privilege, to understand, study and serve the people of India? The moral attitudes and actual behaviour of such people (including the few who were individually Unitarian, Utilitarian, etc) were in complete contrast to those of freebooters who had come to India earlier. And the contrast between the earlier freebooters on one hand and, on the other hand, the Company’s Evangelical or Evangelical influenced officials, was as nothing when compared to the contrast between both of these groups taken together as against the despised missionaries, tens of thousands of them, who came and poured out their lives in remote parts of India to bring health, education,
modern skills, agricultural improvement, and so on – planting the seeds of humane rather than caste based values, and the seeds of mental awakening (i.e. rejection of notions such as reincarnation), far and wide in the subcontinent. And it was these awakened elements among our masses who were attracted by nationalist leaders such as Gandhi and Ambedkar to create the popular movements demanding, first, self-government, and then full independence.
**
Unfortunately, even that hugely-simplified typology of British colonialist enterprise doesn’t fit the pattern of other European colonial enterprises. For example, Portuguese and Spanish colonialism arose from a basically-different culture (Roman Catholic rather than Protestant), and can be typified as follows, much like other non-Protestant cultures, whether Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, or Tribal:
- initial royally-sponsored, rather than royally supported, trading relationships which were intended to be, which were perceived to be, and which in reality often were, mutually beneficial – at least for the respective elites; followed by
- military measures to be prepared to defend, and to expand, those interests where and when useful; followed by
- The militarisation of the entire enterprise in order to extract maximum value from it.
However, Roman Catholic empires suffered, after a delay, the same fate as the British empire, mainly because of the increasing prevalence of the value of freedom in the wake of World War II.
That war had been justified (at least in popular perception) as a fight against tyranny – i.e., for the sake of political and personal freedom. That was at least one reason why the end of the war provided a global boost to the wave of commitment to political and personal liberties, which had been initiated in a small way by the Protestant Reformation and the consequent rise of education, technology, the work ethic, a frugal and modest lifestyle, a middle class, noblesse oblige, and the gradual but inexorable dismantling of the structures of oppression and inherited privilege.
**
India, having gained its independence in 1947, made remarkable progress in its First 5-Year Plan period from the perspective of the average citizen. After that, the progress continued with various ups and downs, till economic liberalisation from 1991 provided a fillip to the economy and to social and cultural transformation. However, since 2014, under the leadership of Narendra Modi, there has been the re-establishment of revanchist forces, which are fighting against India’s Constitutional values of liberty, equality, fraternity, and equal justice for all citizens regardless of religion, gender, caste, and so on. These forces have declared their intention of abolishing that Constitution, and of building an Akhand Bharat (“Undivided India”) which will include Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Tibet. If that happens, these revanchist forces will have expanded India’s internal colonialism to the region immediately around it. In fact, the logic of “Undivided India” extends, in the view of its most radical exponents, eastwards to the whole of the ancient sphere of Indian influence – through Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand to Indonesia (the name itself drives from “Indian Asia”). Whether such revanchist forces will continue to rise, or whether the pendulum will swing back to the forces which support what Vishal Mangalwadi calls the “grand experiment” of modern India, will be the choice before India’s citizens once again in the national elections due in 2024.
**
As in India, so in the world as a whole, we are witnessing a bit of a counter-revolution, with the the rise of contemporary American and Chinese “economic colonialism”. Even large and important countries, such as Russia and India, are having to choose between those world powers.
American global influence, after WWII, was dominated by humanitarian concerns till the rise of realpolitik from 1969 under Nixon’s patronage of Kissinger’s views. From the 1980s, that realpolitik was transformed by the influence of people like Ayn Rand, mediated through the Western elite as represented by people such as Reagan, Thatcher, and Greenspan, which enshrined greed as the ruling principle of global corporate colonialism.
This version of colonialism, as modified by the control of the Communist Party, especially after the ascension of Xi, has resulted in the militarisation of OBOR (One Belt, One Road) and rising tensions in East Asia – which represent the first front of the confrontation between China and the USA.
From that perspective, Russia’s attack on Ukraine may come to be seen as Russia’s proxy war against Europe, in the interests of the rise of China against the USA. Europe now represents a second front at which the US empire must now confront the Chinese empire.
As I write this Epilogue, it seems to be that all those colonialisms are, at least in the minds of an increasing number of people in the world, being dwarfed by the impact of the Covid epidemic from 2019, by environmental considerations, and by concerns about what appears to be the threat of global stagflation ahead.
In spite of those, or perhaps partly because of those, technology speeds ahead, entrenching the preponderance of digital communications, and threatening the continuance of letters – and of stamps.
**
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
Colonialism arises in the human heart out of the instinct to dominate. It is found as much in personal and family relationships as it is in relationships between clans, groups, and nations. The main difference between the colonialism of ancient times and the colonialism of the 21st century is that armies are not as visible – but, make no mistake, just because they are mostly out of sight, doesn’t mean that they don’t exist or are unimportant. Quite the contrary.
Exactly as in the case of personal and group relationships, in the case of national relationships too, there are only two principal groups of contestants: truth, justice and freedom on one side and, on the other side, power and the concomitant possibility of extracting vastly greater benefit than goes to the dominated, colonised and exploited.
There have, of course, been at least a few stamps that have celebrated those who opposed colonialism, and at least a few stamps that have held up before our eyes the lives of the disadvantaged, along with at least a few stamps that have celebrated those who have worked hard to improve the lives of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged. Perhaps we all ought only to collect those stamps? Or, let me put it differently: what is shown about our values by what we collect?
Prabhu Guptara was born and educated in India. He is an advisor to company boards and avid publisher of books and articles such diverse topics as business, technology, education, spirituality, economics, ethics, politics, art, photography, poetry, fiction, and film. Further, he is the Publisher of Salt Desert Media Group Ltd, which has two imprints: Pippa Rann Books & Media (pipparannbooks.com – started in memory of his wife), and Global Resilience Publishing (globalresiliencepub.com), which focuses on global challenges. He is included in Highflyers 50 – the fifty most eminent people of Indian origin living and working outside India – and in Debrett’s People of Today.
